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Case T-317/02, Fédération des industries condimentaires de France (FICF)
and others v. Commission, judgment of 14 December 2004 by the First
Chamber (extended composition) of the Court of First Instance, not yet re-
ported
1. The Trade Barrier Regulation and the Prepared Mustard Case
On 14 December 2004 in the so-called Prepared Mustard case the Court of
First Instance rendered the first – and so far only – judgment1 on the correct
interpretation and application of the Trade Barrier Regulation, normally re-
ferred to as the TBR.2
The TBR is one of the European Union’s common commercial policy in-
struments – but one that has so far attracted surprisingly little attention. In
brief, where Community industries or enterprises (or Member States) find
that they are suffering as a result of obstacles to trade set up by a third coun-
try, the Regulation allows them to request the Commission to open an exami-
nation procedure. If it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient
evidence to justify initiating such procedure, and doing so is in the interest of
the Community, the Commission must examine the case in order to establish
whether the third country pursues a trade practice which is either prohibited
under international trade law or the effects of which international trade law
allows the Community to eliminate. The examination procedure may last up
to five months (extendable up to seven months), following which the Com-
mission must present a report on whether it recommends the adoption of
commercial policy measures – and if so, which measures.
The TBR operates in a politically very sensitive area and the Regulation
itself leaves open a number of important legal questions. Only a limited
1. At present no other cases on the interpretation of the TBR are pending before the Com-
munity judicature in Luxembourg. The judgment was not appealed to the Court of Justice.
2. Council Regulation(EC) No 3286/94, laying down Community procedures in the field of
the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights un-
der international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), O.J. 1994, L 349/71 as amended by Council Regulation (EC) 356/
95, O.J. 1995, 41/3. Hereafter referred to as “the Regulation” or simply as “the TBR”. On the
TBR’s history, see Garcia Molyneux, Domestic Structures and International Trade – The Un-
fair Trade Instruments of the United States and European Union (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
2001), pp. 234–243 and Bronckers and McNelis, “The EU Trade Barrier Regulation Comes of
Age”, (2001) JWT, 427–482 at 428–430. For a recent systematic study, see MacLean, The EU
Trade Barrier Regulation – Tackling unfair foreign trade practices (Sweet & Maxwell, Lon-
don, 2006).
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number of proceedings have been started under the TBR3 and until the Pre-
pared Mustard case no case had been tried before the Community judiciary
in Luxembourg. The importance of the Prepared Mustard case therefore lies
in particular in the fact that it is the first to shed legal light on the TBR.
2. Facts of the case
During the 1980s and first half of the 1990s the Council adopted several di-
rectives against the use of hormones in animal feedstuffs. This led the United
States to bring dispute settlement proceedings before the tribunals of the
WTO, challenging the compatibility of the Community provisions with the
WTO rules. In 1997 the Community provisions were declared to be contrary
to these rules and in early 1998 this decision was upheld on appeal by the
WTO’s appellate body.
The Community did not amend its legislation as required by the WTO,
and the United States therefore sought authorization from the WTO’s Dis-
pute Settlement Body to suspend certain tariff concessions to the extent of
202 million US$ per year. In practice, suspending a tariff concession means
imposing tariffs on imported goods. When applying for this authorization,
the United States produced a list of products for which the tariff concessions
should be suspended (this list included prepared mustard). In July 1999, the
WTO authorized the United States to suspend the tariff concessions to the
extent of 116.8 million US$ per year and to impose additional customs du-
ties of 100 percent on a number of products from the European Community,
including prepared mustard. The United States decided not to apply the sus-
pension to products from the United Kingdom, however. The retaliation was,
in other words, selective in nature (so-called selective sanctioning).
In June 2001 the Fédération des industries condimentaires de France
(FICF) – an organization that comprises the principal French producers of
prepared mustard – lodged a complaint with the European Commission un-
der the TBR. The complaint stated in particular that the selective application
of the US retaliatory measures was contrary to WTO rules. It also stated that
the obstacles to trade created by the United States caused adverse trade ef-
fects within the meaning of the TBR in relation to exports of prepared mus-
tard by members of FICF and that it was in the interests of the Community to
initiate a complaint procedure under the TBR in relation to the measures
3. For an in-depth examination of the use of the TBR over the first decade after its entering
into force, see Crowell & Moring, Interim Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade Barrier
Regulation (TBR) – Final Report, prepared for the European Commission, June 2005.
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taken by the United States. Following receipt of this complaint, the Commis-
sion called for producers of other products that appeared to be affected in a
similar way to prepared mustard to come forward. Several trade organiza-
tions made themselves known to the Commission.
The Commission thereupon initiated an examination and in March 2002 –
almost eight months after initiating the procedure – it sent to the TBR Advi-
sory Committee4 a report in which it proposed that the procedure be termi-
nated. The TBR Advisory Committee approved the proposal to terminate the
procedure and the Commission thereupon sent a copy of the report to FICF
and informed them that a decision to terminate the procedure would be pub-
lished shortly in the Official Journal.
Unsurprisingly, the FICF and the other complainants were not happy
about this outcome. In letters to the Commission, the FICF and two of the
other trade organizations argued amongst other things that the Commission
had not completed and presented its report within the time limit laid down in
the Regulation,5 The Commission replied that it had complied with the time
limits laid down in the Regulation and that the advisers to the trade organiza-
tions had been kept regularly informed of the evolution of the case and that
they were aware of the outcome of the examination procedure well before
the date on which the official report of the examination procedure was com-
municated. The Commission added that the decision to terminate the proce-
dure would be adopted shortly.
On 9 July 2002 the Commission adopted the decision formally to termi-
nate the examination procedure. In support of this, the Commission in recital
6 of the decision explains that:
“The examination procedure led to the conclusion that the alleged adverse
trade effects do not appear to stem from the obstacle to trade claimed in
the complaint, i.e. the [US] practice of applying withdrawal of conces-
sions selectively against some but not all the Member States (selective
sanctioning). In fact, the examination did not provide any evidence of the
fact that making the suspension of concessions also applicable to the
United Kingdom would result in greater export opportunities for the com-
plainant for prepared mustard to the [US] market. Therefore, no adverse
trade effect, as defined in the Regulation, can be attributed to the obstacle
to trade claimed by the complaint, other than the trade effects resulting
from the suspension of concessions which are authorized and lawfully
applied by the United States of America under the WTO Agreement.
4. The Advisory Committee that has been set up in accordance with Art. 7 of the TBR.
5. Art. 8(8) of the Regulation provides that the report shall be presented to the TBR Advi-
sory Committee within 5 months of the announcement of initiation of the procedure. The pe-
riod may, however, be extended to 7 months if the complexity of the examination so requires.
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Therefore, in accordance with Article 11 [of Regulation No 3286/94], the
examination procedure has demonstrated that the interests of the Commu-
nity do not require that a specific action be taken against the alleged ob-
stacle to trade under the Regulation.”
On 16 October 2002 the FICF together with three other French organizations
representing producers of agricultural products6 lodged an application for
annulment against the decision before the Court of First Instance. The case
was referred to a chamber sitting in extended composition.
3. The judgment by the Court of First Instance
As a preliminary point, the Court of First Instance observed that, under the
TBR, Community action is possible only where at least three cumulative
conditions are satisfied namely:
(i) the existence of an obstacle to trade as defined in the Regulation, which
(ii) causes adverse trade effects and
(iii) makes it in the interest of the Community to act.
The Court then went on to analyse all of the complainants’ claims.
First, the complainants argued that the US retaliatory measures as a whole
should be regarded as an “obstacle to trade”. The Court disagreed. It held
that for there to be an “obstacle to trade” which may be relied on under the
Regulation, there must be a right of action under international trade rules.
The US measures had been approved by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
and they therefore were not illegal as such, only their selective nature was
potentially contrary to WTO rules.7
Second, the complainants argued that the Commission had committed a
manifest error in the assessment of the economic data which led it to con-
clude that the selective application of the US measures did not cause adverse
trade effects for the French complainants. The Court observed that the com-
plainants did not contest the accuracy of the data as such, nor the methodol-
ogy applied to analyse them. It being so, the Court found that there was no
manifest error of appreciation: given that UK exporters had not increased
their sales significantly during the period when they were exempt from the
6. The Confédération générale des producteurs de lait de brebis et des industriels de
Roquefort, the Comité national interprofessionnel des palmipèdes à foie gras and the Comité
économique agricole regional “fruits et légumes de la region Bretagne”.
7. The CFI also dismissed an argument that the Commission had misconstrued the scope of
the complaint itself by focusing only on the selective nature of the US measures.
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retaliatory US measures, the Commission was justified in concluding that
French exports would not have benefited had the UK exporters also been
covered by the US measures.
Third, the Court held that once the Commission had found that the US
measures did not cause adverse trade effects, the TBR did not oblige the
Commission to carry out a legal assessment to establish whether those mea-
sures constituted a violation of international trade rules.8
Fourth, on the complex issue of “Community interest”, the complainants
argued that Community action may be in the systemic interest of the Com-
munity even where such action would not benefit the complainant directly.
In this respect the complainants referred to the Commission’s decision to
open the procedure in which it was stated that the US selective retaliation
could “severely affect the cohesion and solidarity of the [Community]”.9
Having recalled that the TBR does not define “Community interest”,10 the
Court made two general findings that: (1) since Community interest involves
a balancing of the different interests of the various affected parties and an
assessment of complex economic issues, judicial review is limited to check-
ing respect for procedural requirements, the correctness of the facts relied
on, absence of errors of law,11 and absence of manifest errors of apprecia-
tion; and that (2) the assessment of Community interest in the decision to
open the examination is of a preparatory nature and cannot deprive the Com-
mission of its power of discretion when deciding whether action is necessary
in the interest of the Community.
More specifically, the Court found that the TBR can be invoked by a com-
plainant to make the Community take action only if the complainant himself
has suffered adverse trade effects. Even if the complainant has suffered such
effects, this is not sufficient to require the Community to act under the Regu-
lation, since the Commission has a wide discretion when assessing the com-
8. See on this point Art. 10(5) of the TBR. In this context, the CFI acknowledged that the
French version of Art. 10(5) of the Regulation contained a grammatical error, see para 79 of the
judgment.
9. Cf. para 96. The complainants also argued that the Commission had failed to examine the
interests of the co-complainants separately from that of the FICF. The products of the co-
complainants were not produced in the UK, however, and so the exclusion of the UK from the
US measures could by definition not have benefited UK producers. The fact that the
Commission’s decision did not mention separately the interests of the co-complainants was, in
these circumstances, not sufficient to entail a violation of the requirement that the procedure
shall be terminated only after it has been established that the interests of the Community do not
require any action, cf. paras. 102–109.
10. Para 89.
11. On this point, the CFI, by way of analogy, made reference to Case T-132/01,
Euroalliages, [2003] ECR II-2359, para 49 (concerning anti-dumping measures).
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mercial interests of the Community, seen as a whole.12 On this basis, the
Court of First Instance upheld the Commission’s decision to close the exami-
nation on the grounds that action was not in the Community interest. It may
be added that although the Court did not explicitly rule on whether WTO ac-
tion for purely systemic reasons may be in the Community interest, it noted
without disapproval that the Commission’s decision did not exclude that pos-
sibility.13
Fifth, the complainants argued that the decision should be annulled since
the Commission (1) by almost one month had exceeded the maximum seven-
month-time-limit14 for completing the examination and transmitting an ex-
amination report to the TBR Advisory Committee and (2) had taken almost
three months to close the examination after consultation with the TBR Advi-
sory Committee. This, the complainants argued, was contrary to the duty to
exercise due diligence and the principle of sound administration.
The Court dismissed both of these claims. First, it held that the Regula-
tion’s time-limits for completing the examination are not mandatory and can-
not therefore entail the illegality of a decision under the Regulation.
However, the Commission should not delay the submission of the examina-
tion report to the TBR Advisory Committee beyond a “period which is rea-
sonable”. Second, the Court found that the absence of any specific
time-limits in the Regulation for deciding on the appropriate follow-up to an
examination after consultation of the TBR Advisory Committee could be in-
terpreted as reflecting the desire of the Community legislature to provide the
Commission with “a certain discretion”. It added, however, that the recogni-
tion of such a discretion does not mean that the Commission may delay the
adoption of a decision beyond “a reasonable time”. Given the obligation on
the Commission to undertake internal consultation with its various services
and the duty to allow sufficient time for the decision to be translated into all
the official languages of the Community, a period of two months and 24 days
was not unreasonable.
Sixth, the complainants claimed that although they were in regular contact
with the Commission throughout the examination procedure, the Commis-
sion should, in accordance with the general principle of the right to a fair
12. Para 122.
13. Para 119.
14. Laid down in Art. 8(8) of the TBR. MacLean, supra note 2 at p. 54, observes that “[t]he
European Commission regularly exceeds the permitted normal period [of five months], and
even the extended period [of seven months] although it cannot be the case that all TBR investi-
gations are exceptional”. See likewise Sundberg and Vermulst, “The EC Trade Barriers Regu-
lation – An Obstacle to Trade?”, (2001) JWT, 989–1013 at 991.
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hearing, have offered them an opportunity to comment on its findings before
finalizing the examination report.
The Court of First Instance rejected this claim: neither Article 8 of the
Regulation nor the general principle of right to a fair hearing oblige the
Commission on its own initiative to send the examination report in draft to
the complainants and other persons concerned. On the contrary, if these per-
sons want to obtain this information, Article 8(4)(a) and (b) impose an obli-
gation to submit a request to the Commission. The Court observed that the
complainants did not claim to have sent the Commission such request.
Since the Court of First Instance also rejected the complainants’ other
pleas, the action was dismissed in its entirety. The complainants did not ap-
peal to the Court of Justice.
4. Comments
The ruling in the Prepared Mustard case does not fall in the category of
groundbreaking judgments, but still it is important since it is the first to cast
light upon a field which has so far been surrounded by considerable uncer-
tainty.
4.1. Margin of manoeuvre on questions of substance
The Court of First Instance allows the Commission a very large margin of
manoeuvre on important questions of substance. This is first of all so on the
key notion of “Community interest”, where the Court observed that the ques-
tion whether the Community interests “require that action be taken involves
appraisal of complex economic situations and judicial review of such an ap-
praisal must be limited to verifying that the relevant procedural rules have
been complied with, that the facts on which the choice is based have been
accurately stated and that there has been a manifest error of assessment of
those facts or a misuse of powers”.15 The Court’s restraint in its judicial re-
view vis-à-vis Community interest follows the traditional formula in trade
policy proceedings.16 In the Fediol case17 the Commission argued that the
assessment of “Community interest” under the New Commercial Policy In-
strument cannot be reviewed by the European Court of Justice at all. The
15. Para 94.
16. Cf.  Bronckers and McNelis, supra note 2 at 450.
17. Case 70/87, [1989] ECR 1781
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judgment in the Prepared Mustard case implicitly rejects that view, but ac-
cepts that the extent of judicial scrutiny is strictly limited.
The Court also allowed the Commission considerable leeway with respect
to establishing whether the measures complained of produce “adverse trade
effects”. On this point the Court argued that the fact that the British produc-
ers of prepared mustard had not significantly increased their market shares
while the French producers were barred from the American market, in itself
showed that the French producers were not adversely affected by the selec-
tivity of the measure. This line of argument appears rather simplistic, how-
ever,18 and one wonders whether the Court would feel compelled to reach the
opposite conclusion if the British producers had significantly increased their
market share.19
In this respect it is important to note that the Court of First Instance ac-
cepts that where the Commission finds that there are no adverse trade ef-
fects, it may dismiss a complaint against foreign trade measures without
conducting a time-consuming legal assessment of whether such measures
violate international trade law. This finding appears very reasonable for two
reasons. Firstly, counter-measures may only be introduced if the Commission
has established that the measures complained of produce adverse trade ef-
fects in the Community. Hence, if no adverse trade effects are felt in the
Community, it is difficult to justify why the Commission should carry on
further examinations. Secondly, examining – not to mention establishing –
that some foreign measures violate international trade law is politically very
sensitive.20
On one point it is somewhat unclear how much leeway the Court allows
the Commission. The complainants argued that the Commission had pro-
duced an incorrect analysis of the adverse trade effects. The Court dismissed
18. If, for example, British, French and American producers of prepared mustard had been
fighting about the American market for this product – and the French and American producers
were winning market shares at the cost of the British producers, the barring of the French
producers from the market could mean that American producers took over the market of the
French producers, while the competitive pressure on the British producers would ease so that
their decline in market share would cease for some time.
19. Obviously the American sanctions were detrimental to the French producers of pre-
pared mustard. The sanctions as such were legal under WTO law, whereas the legality of the
selective application of the sanctions was disputed. For this reason the French producers had to
show that the adverse trade effects flowed from the selectivity. It appears very difficult to argue
that the selective sanctioning in itself has caused adverse trade effects to the French producers.
Indeed, one is tempted to argue that the fact that the British producers were still able to sell into
the US was likely to benefit the French producers as this meant less competition for customers
outside the US.
20. MacLean, supra note 2, at p. 156 notes that ”[t]he initiation of international trade dis-
pute resolution proceedings is generally seen as an unfriendly act by foreign governments”.
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this argument, holding that “the conclusion reached by the Commission is
not manifestly erroneous”.21 That the Court restricted itself to examining
whether the Commission had committed a manifest error of appreciation,
presumably, was due to the fact that the complainants’ claim was limited to
“manifest error” and so the Court did not need to resolve whether its review
goes any further. In other words, the judgment cannot necessarily be taken to
mean that the Court will only intervene if the Commission has committed a
manifest error – although such approach appears to be in line with prior case
law.22
4.2. Consequences of exceeding the time-limit
The Court of First Instance holds that the Commission’s breach of the time-
limit for carrying out TBR examinations does not necessarily have any legal
consequences. In other words, the Commission is granted some flexibility to
exceed the Regulation’s time-limits for carrying out examinations as long as
this does not go beyond a period which is reasonable. There are, however,
limits to this flexibility. Thus the judgment seems to imply that decisions on
the appropriate follow-up to completed TBR examination reports cannot be
postponed for longer than it takes to complete internal Commission deci-
sion-making procedures, since this could amount to “unreasonable delay”.
Along the same line of reasoning, it seems likely that the Court would also
consider (reasonably active) negotiations with a third country on a possible
solution sufficient to make any resulting delay “reasonable”.
The Court did not clarify what legal consequences could ensue in case of
an unreasonable delay, but it explicitly refers to its own earlier judgment in
NTN Corporation and Kyoko Seiko23 in which a Commission regulation im-
posing antidumping duties was annulled due to an unreasonably long delay.
There do not appear to be any strong reasons why the Court of First Instance
should choose a different solution for decisions under the TBR.
4.3. The right to invoke the TBR and the right to be heard
The Court of First Instance found that the TBR can be invoked by a com-
plainant to make the Community take action, only if that complainant has
himself suffered adverse trade effects.24 This does not necessarily mean that
21. Para 71.
22. See e.g. Case C-174/87, Ricoh v. Council, [1992] ECR I-1335, para 68.
23. Joined Cases T-163 & 165/94, [1995] ECR II-1381, see in particular paras. 119–125.
24. Para 122.
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the Commission is precluded from pursuing a complaint under the TBR if
the complainant has not suffered such effects, but it means that the com-
plainant cannot require the Commission to initiate an examination. The
Court also confirmed that the Commission is not obliged formally to consult
the complainants on the draft examination report.25 Moreover, if the Com-
mission concludes that the examination should be closed, the decision to this
effect may limit itself to recalling the principal findings set out in the TBR
examination report.26
5. Concluding remarks
The most apparent conclusion that may be drawn from the ruling in the Pre-
pared Mustard case is the confirmation of the Commission’s practice under
the TBR. This means that the Commission is allowed considerable leeway
when it comes to the interpretation and application of the substantive issues
of the Regulation; i.e. establishing whether the measures complained of con-
stitute an obstacle to trade that produce adverse trade effects in the Commu-
nity and the definition of Community interest. Taking into account the
considerable political sensitivity surrounding the cases that are likely to arise
under the TBR, this approach seems well justified, albeit the reasoning on
adverse trade effects is rather weak. An explanation why the Commission
(and the Court of First Instance) decided to focus on the adverse trade effect
rather than on the legality of the American measures could possibly be that
selective sanctioning was actually considered to be lawful under WTO law,
but that the Commission wanted to avoid openly endorsing the American re-
taliation measures. This could explain why the Commission reverted to the
much weaker argument that there were no trade effects.
On the important issue of standard of review of adverse trade effects, the
judgment in the Prepared Mustard case is quite closely bound to the facts,
which limits its value as a precedent somewhat. Perhaps this is due to the
fact that even if the complainants had won the case, it was difficult to see
that the procedure would lead anywhere.
As to the procedural aspects of the case, the Court equally appears to al-
low the Commission considerable leeway. This is particularly so with respect
to the Commission’s exceeding the time-limits laid down in the TBR. The
Court accepts a delay as long as it is “reasonable”. If the Court had annulled
the decision, the Commission would basically have been forced to issue a
25. Paras. 175–177.
26. Para 132.
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27. In contrast, if a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties is annulled, it is likely to mean
that the duties are postponed for some time.
* University of Copenhagen, Faculty of law. The author gratefully acknowledges the inspi-
ration and comments provided by Dr. Søren Schønberg, DG Trade in respect of this case note.
new one. It seems very unlikely, however, that a new decision would be dif-
ferent from the one annulled and it is equally difficult to see how the annul-
ment would benefit the complainants.27 To put this differently, even if the
Commission had exceeded the time-limit unreasonably, it would not seem to
make real sense to annul the decision.
Morten Broberg*
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